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Digest: Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.
Whitney M. Zanias
Opinion by Kennard, J., with Baxter, Chin, and Corrigan, JJ.
Dissenting opinion by Moreno, J., with George, C.J. and
Werdegar, J.
Issue
Does a common law action for loss of consortium bar a
subsequent wrongful death action for loss of consortium under
res judicata?
Facts
Judy Boeken’s (Boeken) now deceased husband, Richard,
was diagnosed with lung cancer in 1999, after smoking cigarettes
for forty-two years.1 In October 2000, while Richard was still
alive, Boeken filed an action against Philip Morris USA, Inc.
(Philip Morris) for loss of consortium, “seeking compensation for
the loss of her husband’s companionship and affection.”2 In her
complaint, Boeken specifically “alleged that she suffered ‘the loss
of love, affection, society, companionship, sexual relations, and
support.’”3 Approximately four months after Boeken filed her
complaint, she dismissed it with prejudice.4
Richard died one year after Boeken dismissed her action for
loss of consortium.5 Subsequently, Boeken filed a wrongful death
action under California Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60
against Philip Morris for the loss of her husband’s companionship
and affection.6 In this complaint, Boeken specifically alleged that
she had suffered “‘loss of love, companionship, comfort, affection,
society, solace, and moral support.’”7
Philip Morris then demurred on the complaint, claiming that
Boeken’s wrongful death action was barred by res judicata, since
her earlier loss of consortium claim involved the same primary
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right.8 The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to
amend, and Boeken appealed.9 The Court of Appeal affirmed,
concluding that Boeken’s initial loss of consortium action against
Philip Morris “covered claims for lost companionship and
affection between the time of her husband’s actual death from
lung cancer and the time when he would have died of natural
causes if defendant’s cigarettes had not wrongfully injured
him.”10 Therefore, Boeken’s dismissal with prejudice of her loss
of consortium claim acted as a res judicata bar, which prevented
her “from relitigating the same injury—loss of consortium—a
second time in her current wrongful death action.”11 Boeken
petitioned to the California Supreme Court for review.12
Analysis
The court examined the history of wrongful death and
survival actions. At common law, there was no recovery for the
wrongful death of a spouse; however, in 1862, the Legislature
created a wrongful death cause of action.13 Until Rodriguez v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp.,14 courts did not recognize a cause of action
for loss of consortium for the wrongful injury of a spouse.15
However, the Rodriguez court failed to answer whether recovery
for loss of consortium damages are limited to predeath
damages.16
The Rodriguez holding created a significant
distinction between a common law action for loss of consortium
and a statutory wrongful death action.17
Since “loss of
consortium is a civil action sounding in tort,” punitive damages
are available, whereas punitive damages are not available in the
statutory wrongful death action.18
Next, the court examined the precise meaning attached to
the phrase “cause of action” within the context of res judicata:
“The cause of action is the right to obtain redress for a harm
suffered, regardless of the specific remedy sought or the legal
theory (common law or statutory) advanced.”19
Thus, the
determinative factor, under the primary rights theory, is the
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harm suffered.20 Generally, the same primary right is involved
in actions between the same parties seeking compensation for the
same harm.21 In this case, “[t]he primary right was the right not
to be wrongfully deprived of spousal companionship and
affection, and the corresponding duty was the duty not to
wrongfully deprive a person of spousal companionship and
affection.”22 Therefore, Boeken could not sue for the same breach
of duty based on a new legal theory in the second lawsuit.23
Under section 3283 of the California Civil Code, “‘[d]amages
may be awarded, in a judicial proceeding, for detriment resulting
after the commencement thereof, or certain to result in the
future.’”24 Thus, a plaintiff is entitled to recover for both the loss
of companionship and affection during the trial and in the future
for a common law action for loss of consortium.25 In Boeken’s
initial complaint, she sought recovery for the loss of her
husband’s consortium both now and in the future: “[A]s a result
of the cancer he was ‘unable to perform the necessary duties as a
spouse’ and would ‘not be able to perform such work, services,
and duties in the future.’”26 Boeken also alleged in her complaint
that she had been “‘permanently deprived’ of her husband’s
consortium,” which further illustrates Boeken’s anticipation of
her husband’s impending premature death.27
The court also determined that its findings were supported
by Justus v. Atchison, 28 despite Boeken’s claim “that one may not
recover at common law damages of a type . . . made the subject of
a statutory scheme that occupies the field.”29 The Justus court
clearly acknowledged that the right to recover in a wrongful
death cause of action solely exists under the statute, and was not
part of common law.30 Here, the court agreed and found no
parallel development for wrongful death at common law.31
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Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977).
Boeken, 230 P.3d at 351.
Id. (citing Justus, 565 P.2d at 127–29).
Id. at 351.
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Boeken’s reliance on a comment in the Restatement Second
of Torts32 was also rejected by the court.33 This section in the
Restatement applies to situations where the loss of consortium
claim is subsequently joined with a wrongful death claim after
the spouse has died.34 Here, Boeken sued for loss of consortium
prior to her husband’s death, and so the Restatement was not
applicable. If the court were to limit “loss of consortium claims to
the lifetime of the injured spouse,” as Boeken suggested, it would
lead “to multiple proceedings and the possibility of a double
recovery or an inadequate recovery.”35 Instead, the problems are
minimized by allowing spouses to recover damages under loss of
consortium after the death of the spouse.36
Holding
The court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision.37 The
court held that res judicata barred Boeken’s wrongful death
action for loss of consortium.38 Since Boeken brought a prior
common law action for loss of consortium, both claims involved
the same primary right.39 The dismissal with prejudice of the
common law action for loss of consortium is the equivalent of a
final judgment on the merits, and therefore the action may not be
relitigated.40
Dissent
Justice Moreno dissented, explaining that a common law loss
of consortium action involves a primary right different from a
statutory wrongful death action.41 Justice Moreno compared the
holdings of Justus v. Atchison42 and Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp.43 In Justus, the court held that the common law loss of
The Restatement provides:
In case of death resulting to the impaired spouse, the deprived spouse
may recover under the rule stated in this Section only for harm to his or
her interests and expense incurred between the injury and death. For
any loss sustained as a result of the death of the impaired spouse, the
other spouse must recover, if at all, under a wrongful death statute.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 693 cmt. f (1977).
33 Boeken, 230 P.3d at 351.
34 Id. at 351–52.
35 Id. at 352.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 353.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. (Moreno, J., dissenting).
42 Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122, 127 (Cal. 1977).
43 Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 525 P.2d 669, 686 (Cal. 1974).
32

Do Not Delete

2011]

3/16/2011 5:39 PM

Boeken v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc.

567

consortium action was allowed because it was different from the
statutory wrongful death action, whereas in Rodriguez, the court
held that a person may recover loss of consortium damages for a
nonfatal injury of a spouse.44 Justice Moreno believed that these
two cases highlighted the differences between a common law loss
of consortium action and a statutory wrongful death action.
Justice Moreno also noted the differences between the two
causes of action: a common law loss of consortium action involves
only a serious injury, but not death; wrongful death includes an
action for loss of financial support, but loss of consortium does
not; and loss of consortium applies only to spouses, but wrongful
death extends to the children of the deceased.45 Furthermore,
the statute of limitations for a wrongful death action does not
begin at the same time as a loss of consortium action, which it
would if the two actions were a single action.46 Since loss of
consortium and wrongful death are different, Justice Moreno
concluded that a loss of consortium action would not bar a
wrongful death action.47 Instead, Justice Moreno proposed that
courts “look to accompanying settlement agreements [for the
dismissal of loss of consortium claims] to determine precisely the
extent to which the parties were also relinquishing wrongful
death claims,” since there can be some overlap between the
damages recovered for wrongful death and loss of consortium
actions.48
Legal Significance
The court’s decision precludes, under res judicata, a spouse
who has dismissed with prejudice a common law loss of
consortium action from subsequently bringing a statutory
wrongful death action. Now, parties seeking to resolve a common
law loss of consortium action, but do not wish to bar recovery
under a wrongful death action, will no longer use voluntary
dismissal with prejudice as a way of doing so.
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Boeken, 230 P.3d at 354 (Moreno, J., dissenting).
Id. at 354–55.
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